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Foreign Relations as a Matter of
Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of Charming
Betsy
ROGER

P. ALFORD*

Charming Betsy is a canon of construction that construes legislative
enactments consistent with the law of nations. This canon promotes the
passive virtue of avoiding constitutionalproblems by eschewing potential
international law violations through statutory interpretation, thereby
enhancing the United States' performance in foreign affairs. As a rule of
separation of powers, Charming Betsy helps explain how foreign relations
concerns clarify the scope of legislative, executive, andjudicial authority.
But when advocates contend that the Constitution likewise should be read
through the lens of Charming Betsy, they abuse the doctrine by ignoring its
purpose. While structuralguarantees that relate to foreign affairs may be
animatedby foreign relations concerns, there is little supportfor a position
that takes foreign relations into account in interpreting the content of
individual liberties so as to harmonize those liberties with international
norms. The proper function of foreign relations in construing individual
liberties is its traditional one, to justify government authority to curtail
constitutionalguarantees.
1. INTRODUCTION

"[I]nterpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no less than interpretations
of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the global
opinions of mankind."' This opinion, first voiced by Justice Harry
Blackmun, has become a clarion call of the internationalist movement to
2
interpret legislative and constitutional materials in light of foreign opinion.
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu,
California. B.A. Baylor University, 1985; M. Div. Southern Seminary, 1988; J.D. New
York University, 1991; LLM. University of Edinburgh, 1992. For useful comments and
suggestions, grateful acknowledgement is given to Akhil Amar, to the participants at the
Vanderbilt Law School International Legal Theory Roundtable, particularly Allison
Danner, Laurence Helfer, Joel Paul, Eric Posner, and Ingrid Wuerth, and to the
participants at a University of Georgia colloquium, particularly Robert Ahdieh, Daniel
Bodansky, Peter Spiro, and Kevin Heller.
1 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J.
39,48 (1994).
2 Blackmun's quote has been referenced over 200 times in scholarly literature since
its publication and has become a "staple of the internationalist argument... invoked by
the nation's most respected and influential international law scholars." Eugene
Kontorovich, Disrespecting the "Opinions of Mankind," 8 GREEN BAG 2D. 261, 262
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It purports to echo the Jeffersonian ideal that "the global legitimacy of a
fledgling nation crucially depended upon the compatibility of its domestic
law with the rules of the international system within which it sought
acceptance." 3 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently put it, "[f]ar from
[exhibiting hostility] to foreign countries' views and laws ...the founding
generation showed concern for how adjudication in our courts would affect
other countries' regard for the United States." 4 This perspective counsels that
United States courts should not decide cases without paying a decent respect
to the opinions of mankind.
A competing perspective suggests that, while ambiguous statutes may
well be interpreted consistent with the law of nations to facilitate United
States' performance in foreign affairs, it is an altogether more radical
proposition to suggest that foreign influences should inform the protections
of our founding document. 5 This perspective greets with grave caution the
proposition that foreign opinions should inform the content of our
Constitution, which seeks to preserve and protect our republican form of
government and the liberties cherished thereby. This perspective echoes the
Washingtonian fear of the "insidious wiles of foreign influence" whose
intrigues should be resisted by all patriots and whose "tools and dupes usurp
6
the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their own interests."
This perspective counsels that United States courts should decide cases by
(2005). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have referenced it in judicial or extrajudicial
writings. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
"A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of
the Am' Soc'y of Int'l Law (Mar. 30-Apr. 2, 2005), in 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 351,
352 (2005).
3 Harold Hongu Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,
43-44 (2004).
4 Ginsburg, supra note 2 (quoting Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I'd Love to Talk with
You, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 43, 44).
5 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES,

137 (2003); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTrrUTION 116 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Appropriate Role
of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretationof American Law: Hearingon H.R. Res. 568
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (2004) (statement of Rep. Chabot, Chairman of the House Judiciary)
(designating the use of foreign material in constitutional interpretation as "disturbing").
6 Washington's Farewell Address, 1 COMP. MESSAGES & PAPERS PRES. 205, 214
(Sept. 17, 1796) (1897) (hereinafter Washington's Farewell Address]; see also Jed
Rubenfeld, Unilateralismand Constitutionalism,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1979 (2004).
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paying a decent respect to the interest of our nation and its people, and that
foreign influence on judicial authority should be greeted with a skeptical eye.
Thus far the debate over the role of foreign opinion as an interpretive
device has focused almost exclusively on international and foreign law. All
but ignored in this debate are the separate arguments that foreign relations
concerns should also animate our understanding of United States laws.
International diplomacy provides a distinct justification for an international
gloss on judicial interpretation. 7 As one noted scholar put it, "[f]or a country
that aspires to be a world leader in human rights, the death penalty has
become our Achilles' Heel."'8 We cannot simply entrust to the legislature
such questions of foreign policy and international relations. 9 Courts are now
admonished to display a decent respect for the opinions of mankind because
of the impact that a failure to do so will have on United States foreign
relations.
If there is a mascot for the proposition that foreign opinion should inform
federal court decision-making, it is Charming Betsy. That doctrine in its
simplest formulation provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains."' 10 But it has been contorted and co-opted to now oblige an
international gloss on all "existing U.S. legal texts, including the
Constitution."' "I In an effort to look "outward ...to earn the respect of other
nations," we now are admonished by Supreme Court Justices to render
decisions mindful of "the scrutiny of a 'candid World"' in which whatever
the "the United States does, for good or for ill, continues to be watched by
the international community."' 12 We thus should "favor interpretive rules that
assume a national preference to be in conformity with international human
rights law, as ...CharmingBetsy presumes with respect to statutes."' 13 Once
7 See infra text accompanying notes 178-87.
8 Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1108 (2002).

9 Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture: The 2004 Term:
The Supreme CourtMeets InternationalLaw, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 10 (2004).
10 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
1

'Vicki C. Jackson, TransnationalDiscourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S.
Court: Gender Equality, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 271, 335 (2003). Although proponents do
not cite it, the companion case of Talbot v. Seeman has language that parallels Charming
Betsy but will admit of more universal coverage. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
1, 43 (1801) ("[T]he laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable ...be
construed as to infract the common principles and usages of nations, or the general
doctrines of national law.").
12 Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 352.
13 Jackson, supra note 11.
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benignly embedded in the narrow confines of statutory discretion, it has now
metastasized to such a degree that its proponents harbor hope that it soon will
be deeply embedded throughout our corpus juris. As Justice Blackmun
famously put it, he "look[s] forward to the day when the majority of the
Supreme Court will inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the time
14
with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."
This Article seeks to re-examine the role of foreign relations in statutory
and constitutional interpretation, and it will do so through the vessel of
CharmingBetsy. It will take Charming Betsy seriously as a rule of statutory
construction that facilitates the United States' performance in the foreign
affairs arena. This requires a closer look at the original facts of Charming
Betsy to underscore its origins as a case first and foremost about the relation
among nations, not the law of nations. As a doctrine of separation of powers,
the Charming Betsy canon seeks to eliminate international discord in
furtherance of an executive prerogative to comply with international
obligations without inadvertent congressional circumscription. The Article
then examines the development of the doctrine and its potential impact on
legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Legislative authority is limited
in the doctrine of prescriptive jurisdiction, in which CharmingBetsy overlaps
with the presumption against extraterritoriality to the extent that the
extraterritorial application of statutes may offend international jurisdictional
norms. Executive authority is limited in the doctrine of implied congressional
authority, with Charming Betsy clarifying the Youngstown demarcation of
implied congressional authority or admonishment. Finally, judicial authority
is limited by Charming Betsy impacting the scope of questions that are
deemed political rather than legal. In short, a Charming Betsy presumption
facilitates a foreign relations interpretation of legislative, executive, and
judicial authority.
The Article will then focus on the so-called constitutional Charming
Betsy, which is viewed with a jaundiced eye. Unlike statutory interpretation,
the role of foreign relations as a gloss on constitutional interpretation is far
more problematic, particularly when the focus turns to individual liberties.
While foreign relations are of undoubted concern in constitutional provisions
relating to international matters such as war powers or the treaty-making
power, a concern for foreign affairs is far more problematic when one
examines constitutional liberties. This section of the Article argues that there
is little textual, historical, decisional, or theoretical support for a position that
takes international discord into account in interpreting the content of

14 Blackmun, supra note 1, at 49.
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individual liberties. With one or two exceptions, 15 the text of constitutional
liberties is not animated by a concern for foreign relations. Nor is there
historical or precedential support for a constitutional CharmingBetsy. As for
a theoretical justification, this novel approach is premised on the false
syllogism that foreign affairs should impact all constitutional interpretation,
that international discord will flow from any asymmetry between
international obligations and constitutional liberties, and therefore
constitutional guarantees should be refashioned to conform to international
norms. The constitutional Charming Betsy timidly fears that a candid world
is watching us, and therefore we should interpret constitutional guarantees in
order to garner the respect and maintain the good graces of other nations.
This Article concludes by positing that the proper role of foreign relations is
its traditional one-to justify a government's authority to curtail
constitutional guarantees. Constitutional interpretation frequently requires
courts to interpret constitutional liberties in light of asserted executive
foreign affairs demands. These demands may or may not coincide with the
demands of international law.

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The importance of foreign relations in statutory interpretation has been
with us from our foundation. 16 This concern finds its most potent expression
in a presumption that the legislative branch will not unintentionally foment
international discord through measures that violate the law of nations and
thereby encroach upon sensitive issues of executive authority. This doctrine
counsels that the courts will presume that the legislature will wish to avoid
international discord absent a clear intent to the contrary. This presumption
avoids international discord in furtherance of structural harmony consistent
with constitutional demands.
The true purpose of the Charming Betsy doctrine has been the subject of
intense debate. In particular, scholars have debated whether Charming Betsy

15 Particularly the Second Amendment right to bear arms. See infra text
accompanying notes 190-92.
16 Even before the Constitution there were early cases that suggested such a
doctrine. In Rutgers v. Waddington, a case involving a trespass action against a British
citizen who had occupied Rutger's property during the British occupation of New York,
Alexander Hamilton successfully argued before the Mayor's Court of New York City that
a 1783 New York statute should be read consistent with the law of nations. Rutgers v.
Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392, 414-19 (Julius Goebel, Jr.
et al. eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1964); see also Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 1.
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is essentially a norm of international comity or one of separation of powers. 17
As Ralph Stenhardt has elegantly argued, the "apparent simplicity of
Charming Betsy's canon of statutory construction hides a deep and
characteristic complexity that goes to the heart of how international law
should be applied in the courts of the United States."' 8 As discussed below,
close examination reveals that the case, and the doctrine which developed
from it, is animated from a concern for separation of powers, not compliance
with international law per se. Charming Betsy offers the passive virtue of
avoiding foreign conflict through an interpretative device that reads around
potential international violations, which redounds to the benefit of executive
performance in foreign affairs. International law is but an ancillary, not
intended, beneficiary in this structural compact.
A. The Charming Betsy Case
The facts of Charming Betsy amply illustrate the importance that foreign
relations have played in statutory interpretation. A detailed portrait of the
case is required to fully appreciate these foreign relations concerns. This
portrait reveals an executive official loosely interpreting congressional
authorization to violate international law, resulting in an international
imbroglio that threatened the young republic's relations with neutral
European countries that were of critical importance to its future. Given that
over one-fourth of all foreign affairs cases and almost one-half of all
admiralty cases involved the question of prize and salvage, it was critical that
the early Court get these cases right. 19 It did so with great deference to the
importance of executive performance in foreign affairs and with great
sensitivity to the fledgling nation's need and desire to comply with
international maritime law.
In 1794, the United States and Great Britain signed the Jay Treaty, which
resolved the outstanding disputes from the American Revolution and

17 Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 524-33 (1998);
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Jurisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 262 (1993); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a
Canon of Domestic Interpretation,43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1130-31 (1990).
18 Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 1113.
19 Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early JudicialInvolvement in ForeignAffairs: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 882 (2005). Fortyfive percent of all admiralty cases and twenty-eight percent of all foreign affairs cases
from 1791 to 1835 (the Jay and Marshall Court) involved prize and salvage. See id.

2006]

CHARMING BETSY

1345

formalized the peaceful relations between the two countries. 20 This treaty
excited the jealousy of France,2 1 which at the time was at war with Britain.
On the heels of President Washington's controversial Neutrality
Proclamation of 1793, the Jay Treaty was received by revolutionary France
as a further affront to Franco-American relations and a clear violation of the
1778 Franco-American treaties of alliance and commerce. 22 Moreover, the
Jay Treaty divided the country: Republicans such as Thomas Jefferson
denounced Federalists such as Washington and Adams as "apostates who
have gone over to [English] heresies, men who were Samsons in the field and
Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot
23
England.
Soon thereafter, French armed vessels began seizing American
commercial vessels that traded with the British enemy, with French
privateers capturing hundreds of American ships in 1798 and infesting
American coastal waters, crippling foreign commerce. 24 This prompted
Congress beginning in 1798 to pass retaliatory legislation authorizing
American vessels to seize French vessels hovering off the American coast.
Thus began the two-year undeclared "Quasi-War" with France.
In the furtherance of this undeclared war with France, Congress passed
legislation that was "tantamount to a declaration of war."'2 5 From May 1798
to February 1800, Congress declared all treaties with France abrogated,
provided for internment of enemy aliens in case of war, increased the regular
army, appropriated funds for new war vessels, suspended commercial
intercourse between the United States and France, and passed the Alien and
Sedition Act. 26 The country was firmly placed on a war footing.
The specific legislation at issue in Charming Betsy was the Non20 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].
21 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 109 (1804).
22 See generally H.J.K. Jenkins, The Quasi-War and American Fears of a French
Invasion in 1798, 89 MARINER'S MIRROR 462 (2003), for a discussion on the "QuasiWar" with France that led to the passage of this legislation; STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at
643-90 (1993); SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
111-25 (5th ed. 1965); ALEXANDER DE CONDE, THE QUASI-WAR (1966); MICHAEL J.
CRAWFORD & CHRISTINE F. HUGHES, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, 4 THE REESTABLISHMENT OF
THE NAVY, 1787-1801: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY (1997),
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm.
23 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 483 (2001).
24 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supranote 22, at 645.

25 CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 77.
26 BEMIS, supra note 22, at 118.
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Intercourse Act of February 27, 1800, one of the earliest precursors to our
modem-day Trading With the Enemy Act. 27 In that Act, Congress prohibited
United States vessels from engaging in commercial dealings with France.
The legislation provided in relevant part:
[I]t shall be lawful for the President ... to give instructions to the public
armed vessels of the United States, to stop and examine any ship or vessel
of the United States on the high sea, which there be reason to suspect to be
engaged in any traffic or commerce contrary to this act, and if upon
examination, it shall appear that such ship or vessel is bound or sailing to,
or from any port or place, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act,
it shall be the duty of the commander of such public armed vessel, to seize
every ship or vessel engaged in such illicit commerce, and send the same to
the nearest convenient port of the United States, to be there prosecuted in
due course of law, and held liable to the penalties and forfeitures provide by
this act. 28
The statute defined a United States vessel to include "any vessel owned,
hired, or employed wholly or in part by any person ... resid[ing] within the
29
United States, or [by] any citizen ... thereof resid[ing] elsewhere."
Based on such "French non-intercourse" legislation, the President
instructed the commanding officers of armed vessels to "be vigilant that
vessels or cargoes really American, but covered by Danish or other foreign
papers, and bound to, or from, French ports, do not escape you." In so doing,
the commanders nonetheless should be "extremely careful not to harass, or
30
injure the trade offoreign nations with whom we are atpeace."
What followed from this legislation and its implementation was an
international imbroglio between the United States and Denmark regarding
the treatment of neutral vessels. 31 Such litigation involving the Non27

50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000).

Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7, 10 (1800).
29 Id. at 8.
30 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170-72 (1804) (omission of some
28

emphasis).
31 Other Danish vessels were also being seized pursuant to such French
nonintercourse legislation. See Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458, 458 (1806);
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 173 (1804); Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. 499, 499
(1806); Stewart v. M'Intosh, 4 H&J 233, 1816 WL 640 (Md. 1816).
In Maley, a Danish vessel was seized by a Lieutenant Maley, described by the

Secretary of Navy as "a very ignorant illiterate man [who] has been dismissed [from] the
Service principally for his conduct toward Neutral Vessels." See Letter from the
Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of State (Nov. 25, 1800), reprinted in 6 NAVAL
DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUAsi-WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE:
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Intercourse Act was among the first controversies in the history of the
republic over the proper use of United States naval warships.
It should be emphasized that in the late 18th century:
[N]eutral shipping was always fair game for belligerents, all but irresistibly
so, no matter how well or how badly the neutrals might behave in the area
of diplomacy .... [E]ach belligerent [was] determined not only to secure
the advantages of neutral trade.., but also to deny them to his enemy ....
seen than in the French
This was nowhere more openly or extravagantly
32
West Indies during the final years of the 1790s.
While the law of nations protected neutral vessels, the custom of nations
was an altogether different matter. In essence, maritime law was entrusted to
privateers whose love of money-not country-inspired implausible pretexts
for the capture of neutral vessels. Thus it was that the Charming Betsy fell
into the hands of French privateers in the summer of 1800.
In response to such capture, and in furtherance of congressional
authorization, on July 3, 1800, Captain Alexander Murray of the American
frigate Constellation recaptured the Charming Betsy from the French
privateers, which was at that time headed for the French island of
Guadaloupe. 33 The Charming Betsy was taken to Martinique and 34then
Philadelphia, where it was later sold in forfeiture pursuant to the statute.
NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM JUNE 1800 TO Nov. 1800, at 548 (1938) [hereinafter 6 NAVAL
DOCUMENTS]. Believing her to be a French vessel in disguise, Maley captured Schooner
Mercator, flying under Danish colors and owned by Charming Betsy's owner, Jared
Shattuck. The Supreme Court held that Maley lacked probable cause for seizing the
Danish vessel and was liable for damages. See Maley, 7 U.S. at 483.
32 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 22, at 649.
33 For a detailed description of the recapture of Charming Betsy and subsequent
trial, see Frederick C. Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshall Court, 45 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 1 (2001).
34 "I have thought it proper to send the Danish, (or American) Schooner to
Phi[ladelphia] for tryal [as] she comes clearly under my Instructions in the 5 Sec[tion] of
the Act preventing an intercourse with the French .... Letter from Captain Alexander
Murray to Secretary of Navy (July 12, 1800), reprintedin 6 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra
note 31, at 139; see also Letter from Secretary of Navy to Captain Alexander Murray
(Nov. 25, 1800), reprintedin 6 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 31 at 549 ("You mention
in your letter to me of the 12th July 1800-that this Vessel was under very doubtful
circumstances-that you should send her to the U[nited] States for trial ... and that she
clearly came under your Instructions in the 5th Sect[.] of the Act of Congress, preventing
an intercourse with the French-That act expired with the 3d March 1800; but the 8t
Section of the Act 'further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the U[nited]
States and France', amounts substantially to the same, as the 5th Section of the former
act.").
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On what pretext did both the French privateers and Captain Murray
justify the capture of this neutral Danish vessel? Originally, the Charming
Betsy was an American vessel that had been sold on June 18, 1800 to one
Jared Shattuck, a former United States citizen residing in St. Thomas who
became a naturalized Danish citizen in 1796 and who, upon completion of
the sale, documented the ship as a Danish vessel. According to Captain
Murray, the French captured the vessel "upon strong grounds of her being an
American" and that according to the French process verbal the ship "was
under false papers" as a Danish rather than an American vessel. 3 5
Upon recapturing the "American" vessel from the French, Captain
Murray thought-incorrectly as it turned out-that he "had no alternative but
to take her to Martinique" for adjudication as an American vessel engaged in
commercial intercourse with the French in violation of the statute. 36 Murray
expressed "hope it will appear that I have been perfectly consistent in my
conduct in this Business" for in truth "few Commanders have been as
cautious as myself in molesting the trade of any Neutral Power. 3 7
Captain Murray's actions were taken at great personal risk, for as Chief
Justice Marshall put it, "[a] commander of a ship of war of the United States,
in obeying his instructions from the President of the United States, acts at his
peril. If those instructions are not strictly warranted by law he is answerable
in damages to any person injured by their execution. '3 8 This was precisely
the fate of Captain Murray in unlawfully seizing the Charming Betsy.
On behalf of its Danish subject, the Danish consulate brought a case
against Captain Murray for the seizure of the vessel. 39 Captain Murray lost
the case in trial court on April 28, 1801, and was ordered to pay
compensation of $14,930.50---over ten times his annual salary. 40 Captain
Murray appealed to the Secretary of the Navy to post the appeal bond. 4' In
deliberating on the matter, the Acting Secretary of Navy noted on May 12,
1801:

35 Letter from Captain Alexander Murray to the Secretary of the Navy (Nov. 29,
1800), reprintedin 6 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 561-62.
36 Id.
37 Id.

38 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, at 170 (1804) (emphasis omitted).
39 Leiner, supra note 33, at 10.
40
Id.
41 Letter from Captain Alexander Murray to the Secretary of the Navy (Sept. 1,
1801), reprinted in 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUAsI-WAR BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND FRANCE: NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM DECEMBER 1800 TO DECEMBER

1801, at 280 (1938) [hereinafter 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS].
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Captain Murray informs me that the... Consul, on the part of the claimants
demand a compensation for damages alleged to have been sustained by the
recapture of the Danish schooner Charming Betsy .... Capt[ain] Murray
his instructions to make this recapture
conceived himself authorized 4by
2
Port.
into
Vessel
the
[and] send
Captain Murray's timing could not have been worse. Two days later, on
May 14, 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli declared war against the United States
after Jefferson refused to pay the annual tribute to stave off state-sponsored
43
Thus, at the same time the Jefferson
pirates in the Mediterranean.
to defend Captain Murray's
whether
deciding
was
Administration
Betsy, it was fighting a war in
Charming
vessel
mistreatment of the neutral
passage of neutral vessels
safe
of
Northern Africa to defend the principle
from Barbary pirates. In justifying the first overseas war for the young
nation, it could hardly afford the perception that its own naval officers were
insensitive to the principle of freedom for neutral commerce on the high seas.
Noting in September 23, 1801, that his "predecessors seem to have
entertained a doubt with respect to the propriety of Executive interposition,"
the Secretary of Navy stated that "[o]pinions so respectful have created in my
mind much hesitation and have induced me to take the more time to form my
44
ultimate determination upon the Subject." In the end, the Secretary of the
Navy concluded:
Much however as my various Engagements have pressed upon me, I have
been induced to give this case due Consideration, and my opinion is that the
Executive can consistently and under the Circumstances of the Case ought
in the Exercise of a reasonable discretionary power, to afford protection to
the officer of the Government, & to endeavour to prevent an eventual Loss
45
to the public.
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Navy posted the appeal bond on behalf
of Captain Murray. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the question before the
Court was whether the "Charming Betsy [was] subject to seizure and
46
condemnation for having violated a law of the United States." The holding
depended on a finding that Jared Shattuck was an American citizen and
Letter from Samuel Smith for the Acting Secretary of the Navy to Alexander J.
Dallas, (May 12, 1801), reprintedin 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 41, at 225-26.
43 BEMIS, supranote 22, at 176.
44 Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to George Harrison, Navy Agent, (Sept. 23,
42

1801), reprintedin 7 NAVAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 41, at 287.
45 Id.

46 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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Charming Betsy was an American vessel within the meaning of the statute.
Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Captain Murray's seizure was
unwarranted, because the papers appeared perfectly in order and no
substantial reason existed to support the suspicion that she was an American
vessel within the meaning of the statute. 47 This was despite the fact Captain
Murray had seized the vessel from the French, who likewise thought the
vessel was an American one traveling under false Danish papers.
The most important aspect of the decision was the Court's use of the law
of nations to interpret the congressional measure. The Court held:
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can
never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce,
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
48
country.
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the "correct
construction" of the statute was that the vessel must be owned by a United
States citizen "not at the time of the passage of the law, but at the time when
the act of forfeiture shall be committed." 49 In language reminiscent of
modem international law jurisprudence on prescriptive jurisdiction, the Court
stated that, "[i]f it was intended that any American vessel sold to a neutral
should, in the possession of that neutral, be liable to the commercial
disabilities imposed on her while she belonged to citizens of the United
States, such extraordinary intent ought to have been plainly expressed." 50
Regarding whether Shattuck was an American national, the Court was
faced with the "politically explosive issue of expatriation." 5 1 Most
Republicans believed that a person had a natural right to change citizenship,
while most Federalists maintained that nationality was inalienable. 5 2 The
Court avoided addressing the question directly. Instead it found that
Shattuck, as a foreign domicile who swore allegiance to the Danish crown,
took himself "out of the description of the act" as a United States citizen. The
Court found that the Charming Betsy, although it was regularly "employed in
carrying on trade and commerce with a French island," the ship could not be

47
48
49

Id.at 122.
Id.at 118.
Id.at 119.

50 Id.
51 JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 338 (1996).

52 Id.; Leiner, supra note 33, at 12.
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forfeited because "at the time of her recapture [it was] the bona fide property
53
of a Danish burgher."
The offense of French intercourse was committed by a Danish vessel
owned by a Danish citizen, which under a proper interpretation of the law
was no offense at all. What animated the Court's reference to the law of
nations was a concern about foreign relations. Congress passed a statute
concerning the seizure of vessels engaged in commercial intercourse with
France in a time of war. Absent such congressional action, it was, to quote
Chief Justice Marshall in the companion case of Little v. Barreme, "by no
means clear that the president of the United States... might not, without any
special authority for that purpose ... have empowered the officers
commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to seize and send into
port for adjudication." 54 Anticipating Youngstown, 55 the Court concluded
that it had no need to address the question of inherent executive authority.
Congress had spoken on a matter pertaining to foreign commerce,
prescribing the manner in which the law was to be carried into execution.
This included stopping and examining any ship or vessel of the United States
on the high sea "which there be reason to suspect to be engaged in any traffic
or commerce contrary to the act."'56 The executive branch, through
commanding officers of the armed services, seized numerous neutral vessels
under suspicion that they were American vessels engaged in French
commercial intercourse. One Navy captain, "acting upon correct motive,
from a sense of duty,"' 57 believed himself authorized by congressional action
to seize a Danish vessel on the suspicion that it actually might be an
American vessel. Based on this and similar incidents, 58 a powerful foreign
government protested the United States' conduct and successfully sued the
captain in United States court for the seizure of the vessel. With great
hesitation, the executive branch agreed to post a bond and pursue the case on
appeal on behalf of its Navy officer who took the dubious actions based on
his perceived authority. To avoid future incidents, the Supreme Court relied
53 CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 120-21.
54 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804). The Court noted that the
authority to seize vessels is "derived not only from our municipal law... but [also] from
the law of nations." CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 80.
55 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see infra notes
116-37 and accompanying text.
56 Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7, 10 (1800).
57 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi-War Cases-And Their Relevance to Whether
"Letters of Marque and Reprisal" ConstrainPresidentialWar Powers, 28 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 465 (2005); Kenneth W. Kemp & Charles Hudlin, Civil Supremacy over the
Military: Its Nature and Limits, 19 ARMED FORCES & Soc'Y 7, 13-15 (1992).
58 See supranote 31.
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upon a doctrine that, whenever possible, congressional legislation should
"never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce,
further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country." 59 Such an interpretation provides clear guidance to executive
officers to avoid statutory constructions that create international friction of
the kind encountered in Charming Betsy. Foreign relations concerns militate
against a presumption that Congress would take action to create international
tensions for the executive branch with measures inconsistent with the law of
nations.
As historian Frederick Leiner has noted, "[t]he international situation
confronting the United States best explains how the Court decided the
Charming Betsy case." 60 With the Barbary Coast War in full swing, the
British and French at war again, and the United States having the second
largest merchant marine in the world, American neutral vessels were
unusually vulnerable to attack.
To the Marshall court, the importance of the CharmingBetsy case was
not the rule of construction generations of lawyers have come to cite.., but
the reinforcement of international law norms at a time when a militarily
weak neutral nation with extensive mercantile interests at stake desperately
61
wanted the law respected.
B. The Charming Betsy Doctrine
From this case, the Charming Betsy doctrine emerged. But it was not
until the 1950s that it came into its own. 62 The most recent pronouncements
by the Supreme Court confirm that Charming Betsy is a constitutional
avoidance doctrine premised on a concern for separation of powers.
Whenever possible, courts will construe statutes to be consistent with
international law so as to avoid interpretations that will give rise to
international discord. That is, the substantive reach of an ambiguous statute
must be construed in light of the implications that an international law
violation would have for the executive branch. Consistent with separation of
powers concerns, it reflects a desire to interpret statutes to avoid inter-branch
usurpations of power and carefully husbands the complex relationship of the
federal branches in the international context.

59 CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
60 Leiner, supra note 33, at 17.
61 Id at 18.

62 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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Although implicit in numerous cases, the Supreme Court has expressly
relied upon the Charming Betsy doctrine in approximately a dozen cases in
the past one hundred years. 63 The first important citation to the doctrine in
the Twentieth century was in the 1953 case of Lauritzen v. Larsen, which
presented a modem variation of the same issue addressed in CharmingBetsy:
whether an ambiguous statute should be,construed to regulate the maritime
operations of a foreign vessel. 64 "[B]y usage as old as the Nation, such
statutes have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which
American law would be considered operiative under prevalent doctrines of
international law." 65 Such an admonition, the Court found, is consistent with
the "long-heeded admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall" in Charming
Betsy.6 6 The precise theoretical basis for the Court's conclusion that the
Jones Act should not reach foreign actors is unclear, but the overarching
concern was to avoid international discord through statutory interpretations
that might otherwise create a multiplicity of overlapping and conflicting
burdens. 67 One should construe a statute consistent with international law
because that law derives its force from common acceptance of rules designed
68
to foster amicable international relations.

63 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S.
93 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155 (1993); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Benz, 353 U.S. at 138; Lauritzen, 345
U.S. at 571.
64 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578-79 ("[W]e are simply dealing with a problem of
statutory construction rather commonplace in a federal system by which courts have to
decide whether 'any' or 'every' reaches to the limits of the enacting authority's usual
scope or is to be applied to foreign events or transactions.").
65 Id. at 577.
66 Id. at 578 ("This doctrine of construction is in accord with the long-heeded
admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall that 'an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.")
(quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
67
Id. at 581.
68
Id. at 581-82. One of the most recent cases, F. Hoffinan-La Roche, provides a
virtually identical rationale for the Charming Betsy doctrine. See F. Hoffinan-La Roche,
542 U.S. at 164 ("This rule of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they
write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations
work together in harmony ....
").
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Four years later in Benz v. CompaniaNaviera Hidalgo, S.A., the question
was whether United States labor laws "applie[d] to a controversy involving
damages resulting from the picketing of a foreign ship operated entirely by
foreign seamen under foreign articles while the vessel [was] temporarily in
an American port. ' 69 Declining the invitation to rule that the labor laws
applied in such circumstances, the Court noted the diplomatic fallout that
would result from such an application 70 and applied the Charming Betsy
canon without citation to avoid such international discord:
[H]ere such a 'sweeping provision' as to foreign applicability was not
specified in the Act .... For us to run interference in such a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of
international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain. We,
therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed to the Congress
rather than the courts. 7 1
The Court made a similar finding in McCulloch, a case involving the
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court held that "we
find no basis for a construction which would.., apply its laws to the internal
management and affairs of the vessels here flying [a foreign] flag, contrary to
the recognition long afforded them ... by our State Department. '72 The
Court reasoned that:
The presence of such highly charged international circumstances brings to
mind the admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Charming
Betsy... that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains." We therefore
conclude ... that for us to sanction the exercise of local sovereignty under
such conditions in this "delicate field of international relations there must be
present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. '7 3
None of these early cases clearly articulated the basis of the decision as
grounded in separation of powers. One might find the doctrine as a rule
based on international law, by which one sovereign power is bound to respect
the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 138-39 (1957).
70 Id. at 146.
69
71
72

Id. at 146-47.

McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21
(1963) (citations omitted).
73 Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted).
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territory. But the Court has since clarified that the doctrine, in fact, has
constitutional underpinnings, derived from domestic separation of powers
concerns and reflecting the sense that the legislative branch, in passing
statutes that inadvertently offend international obligations, will hinder the
conduct of foreign relations.
This justification for the doctrine finally was made explicit in the case of
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, where the Court construed
McCulloch as a case in which the Court "declined to read [the statute] so as
to give rise to a serious question of separation of powers which in turn would
have implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over
relations with foreign nations."'74 Consistent with McCulloch, the Court in
Catholic Bishop extended this principle beyond structural concerns, first
examining whether "serious constitutional questions 75 were implicated by
the statute in question 76 and, if so, whether those concerns could be
alleviated through statutory interpretation that avoided First Amendment
problems. 77 Finding no clear expression of Congress' intent, the Court
construed the ambiguous statute to avoid the constitutional issue.7 8
The Court offered a similar construction of McCulloch in Weinberger v.
Rossi, recognizing that Charming Betsy was applied in McCulloch to avoid
an interpretation that was contrary to State Department regulations. 79
Following McCulloch, the Court in Rossi found that where a statute touches
upon the United States' foreign policy, a clear statutory intent to repudiate
international obligations must be evident. 80 Recognizing that executive
agreements represent a quid pro quo, the Court took into account the foreign
policy implications that would flow from a statutory interpretation that would
abrogate executive agreements regarding the preference for employment of
local nationals over United States civilian dependents on United States

74 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
75
Id. at 501.
76 Id.at 501-04.
77 Id. at 504-07.
78
Id. at 507.
79 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 265 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe Court has...
recognized that Benz and McCulloch are reserved for settings in which the extraterritorial
application of a statute would 'implicate sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive
over relations with foreign nations.' The strictness of the McCulloch and Benz
presumption permits the Court to avoid, if possible, the separation-of-powers and
international-comity questions associated with construing a statute to displace the
domestic law of another nation.").
80 Rossi, 456 U.S. at 32.
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military bases. 8 1 The import of Rossi is that when the Executive makes
promises in international agreements, the Court requires a clear
congressional statement to effect a breach of those promises.
One can see then that the Charming Betsy doctrine is a rule premised on
the avoidance of structural discord through avoidance of international
discord. The canon thus admonishes courts to "not lightly assume that
Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it."'8 2 The narrow rule of construing statutes
to avoid violations of the law of nations in fact supports what the Court in
DeBartolo described as the much broader "cardinal principle" rooted in
Charming Betsy that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress." 83 This reading of CharmingBetsy comports with the
general purpose of statutory presumptions, for
when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a
court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice .... [Such a
canon] is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of
a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not
84
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.

In short, constitutional avoidance is the "essence" of the Charming Betsy
85

doctrine.
As these later cases underscore, in one sense Charming Betsy enhances
executive freedom in the foreign affairs arena, presuming that Congress has
not inadvertently required the Executive to perform functions that would
repudiate international obligations and generate international discord.
However, as the original Charming Betsy case illustrates, 86 the doctrine also
curtails executive freedom by presuming that Congress has not inadvertently
authorized the Executive to perform functions that would violate
81 Id. at 29-35.
82 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 n.12 (2001).
83 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr., 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 629 (1993).
84 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
85 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
86 See also MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1913); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the
Use of Force, InternationalLaw, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293,
340-45 (2005) (discussing application of CharmingBetsy in MacLeod and Chew Heong).
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international law and thereby undermine foreign relations. In both cases, the
purpose is to interpret ambiguous statutes to avoid foreign relations
difficulties for the United States. The judicial role is to presume that, as a
matter of course, Congress does not wish to foment international discord in
the passage of ambiguous statutes that might be construed to authorize or
require violations of international obligations. 87 It also serves to depoliticize
the courts through plausible interpretations that avoid foreign tensions absent
a clear political statement of intent to violate international law. Charming
Betsy's clear-statement rule unburdens the courts from the foreign policy
implications that might flow from interpretations that would work an
international wrong. In this sense, CharmingBetsy serves as a coordinating
function among the three branches on matters that implicate foreign relations.
The separation of powers conception of Charming Betsy has been aptly
summarized as one that
[e]mphasizes institutional relationships rather than legislative intent or
respect for international law .... [It] acknowledges that the violation of
international law can create foreign relations difficulties for the United
States. But it takes no view as to whether particular violations of
international law are desirable or undesirable from the U.S. perspective. Nor
does it agree with the internationalist conception that courts should
supplement U.S. positive law with international law. It simply rests on the
belief that, for formal and functional reasons, the political branches should
determine when and how the United States violates international law. 88
With the Court explicitly having construed the Charming Betsy doctrine
as a constitutional rule of separation of powers, one can find its application in
unexpected contexts. Although rarely discussed, Charming Betsy helps
explain foreign relations' limitations on legislative, executive, and judicial
authority.

87 Wuerth, supra note 86, at 339 ("To the extent the canon is based on separation-ofpowers concerns, it may be designed at least in part to prevent courts from construing
statutes to create a violation of international law unintended by either Congress or the
President.").
88 Bradley, supra note 17, at 526; see also Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of
Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627, 714 (2001) ("[Tihe Charming Betsy
canon allows the courts to sound out the political branches as to whether and how they
wish to violate international law, reduces judicial interpretations mistakenly placing the
United States in conflict with customary international law, and reduces inadvertent
interference by Congress with the President's diplomatic prerogatives.").
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C. Charming Betsy and Legislative Authority
The impact of foreign relations finds one of its most common
applications in discerning whether the legislative branch has prescriptive
authority over foreign acts and actors. The presumption is that it does not, a
statutory canon commonly described as the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The exceptions to this presumption are narrow and few,
limited to prescribing conduct that has a clear national nexus. 89 The rule has
been invoked as an assumed application of congressional intent:
The vast run of statutes are enacted with only the intrastate situation in
mind ....[T]his is so even if, as is frequently the case, the statute employs
such sweeping terms as "every contract" or "every decedent." Unless it
appears that the draftsmen so intended, language of this sort is not to be
taken literally to mean that the statute is applicable to every transaction
wherever occurring or to every case brought in the forum. Where, on the
other hand, it is clear that the legislature has actually addressed itself to the
choice of law problem, the courts, subject to the limitation of
90
constitutionality, must give effect to its intentions.
Although formally delineated as a separate rule of statutory construction,
the presumption against extraterritoriality is in fact commonly employed as a
subsidiary rule of specific application of the CharmingBetsy doctrine. With
limited exceptions, prescribing foreign conduct of foreign actors is a
violation of international law. Such violations engender international discord
and undermine United States conduct in foreign relations. The presumption
against extraterritoriality is a device used to construe ambiguous statutes to
avoid such violations.
The facts of Charming Betsy represent a conflation of the two
presumptions, addressing the question of whether the statute should be read
to apply to a foreign vessel and foreign citizen, both of which previously had
American allegiances. 9 1 Charming Betsy's progeny likewise incorporates

89

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

402

(1987); Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435,
480-508 (Supp. 1935); Roger P. Alford, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust
Laws: The United States and EuropeanCommunity Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4

(1992).
90 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7 (1953) (quoting Elliott E. Cheatham &
Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLuM. L. Rv. 959, 961 (1952)).
91 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 119 (1804) ("If it was
intended that any American vessel sold to a neutral should, in the possession of that
neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities imposed on her while she belonged to
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both presumptions, with many subsequent cases applying CharmingBetsy to
address the extraterritorial application of domestic laws. 92 Lauritzen
exemplifies the interplay of the two presumptions, with the literal
universality of a prohibition limited to the objects for which the legislature
intended them to apply, and Charming Betsy invoked in support of the
general international rule that "if any construction otherwise be possible, an
Act will not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by
them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting." 9 3 Indeed, the
Court has emphasized that the foreign policy concerns underlying Charming
in
Betsy apply with special force to "the construction of statutes couched 94
general language which are sought to be applied in an extraterritorial way."
Most recently, the foreign policy implications that animate the two
presumptions were the focus of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.95 In Sosa, the Court stressed that a number of
factors urge judicial caution in creating a private right of action for human
rights abuses under the Alien Tort Statute. Among these factors was the
following:
[T]he potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of
recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary of impinging
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs. It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional
limits on our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another
to considersuits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a

foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits ....Since
many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new
norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign 9policy
6
consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution.
Although Sosa never expressly warned of extraterritorial violations of
prescriptive jurisdiction, its reference to the foreign relations concerns over
lawsuits that claim to delimit the power of a government over its own people
undeniably speaks to the issue. This concern is precisely that which the two

citizens of the United States, such extraordinary intent ought to have been plainly
expressed.").
92 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957); Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 571.
93 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578.
94 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
95 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004).
96

Id.(emphasis added).
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canons seek to avoid: the assertion of judicial authority beyond the confines
circumscribed by international law. Put simply, the Court is saying that
"great caution" is required under the Alien Tort Statute to show fidelity to
international law norms on prescriptive jurisdiction, and failure to do so will
exacerbate foreign relations concerns. 97 That is, adverse foreign policy
consequences counsel against violating international jurisdictional norms in
vindicating international human rights norms.
The significance of the interplay between the two presumptions is that
both presumptions advance the same basic concern: to "protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord. ' 98 But like Charming Betsy, the presumption
against extraterritoriality avoids international discord in order to protect
against unintended violation of international law. Its function is broader than
simply "the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations." 99 As the
Court recently put it, "acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial
application unless such an intent is clearly manifested. That presumption has
special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may
involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique
responsibility. '"00
Having said this, it cannot be denied that the two presumptions have
often been treated as separate and distinct. 10 1 The confusion over the two
presumptions lies in the fact that not every extraterritorial application of our
laws is a violation of international law. CharmingBetsy and the presumption
against extraterritoriality regularly overlap, but not inevitably so. "But if the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome," the Charming
Betsy canon "is relevant to determining the substantive reach of a statute
because the 'law of nations' ... includes limitations on a nation's exercise of
its jurisdiction to prescribe."' 1 2 To the extent that Congress regulates conduct
extraterritorially consistent with international norms of prescriptive
jurisdiction, Charming Betsy is not at play, although the presumption against
extraterritoriality may still be. Thus, in Aramco, a case involving the alleged
prescription of foreign conduct of United States nationals, the dissent
97 Jason Jarvis, A New Paradigmfor the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterritoriality
and the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 671, 699-722 (2003) (discussing
international norms of prescriptive jurisdiction as applied to the Alien Tort Statute).
98 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing
McCulloch in support of a presumption against extraterritoriality).

99 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993).
10Id.at 188.
101 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 261-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102 Id at 814-15.
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correctly notes that the majority liberally borrowed language from Charming
Betsy's progeny 10 3 without a full appreciation of the distinction between
regulating persons of foreign versus American allegiance, the latter of which
are clearly subject to regulation consistent with international law under the
"nationality exception."' 1 4 As Justice Marshall put it:
[tihe strictness of the McCulloch and Benz presumption permits the Court to
avoid, if possible, the separation-of-powers and international-comity
questions associated with construing a statute to displace the domestic law
of another nation. Nothing nearly so dramatic is at stake when Congress
10 5
merely seeks to regulate the conduct of United States nationals abroad.
Moreover, a determination that a statute is consistent with international
law and overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality may itself be
based on foreign relations concerns. This commonly is the situation when our
antitrust laws are enforced against foreign conduct of foreign nationals that
has a substantial effect on the United States. Such a scenario subjects
congressional regulation to an international rule of reason, which
incorporates concerns for international conflict. 10 6 As the Court in Hoffmnan
recently noted, "our courts have long held that application of our antitrust
laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is ... reasonable, and hence
consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a
legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused."'10 7 Charming Betsy counsels that
Congress intended to regulate foreign acts of foreign actors because such
conduct imposes substantial harms on the domestic market. Doing so is a
reasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. 10 8 But for structural reasons
we impute no congressional intent to regulate foreign conduct that causes
only foreign harms, unless the executive branch has made the calculus that
the public interest in enforcement overcomes considerations of foreign
governmental sensibilities. 10 9 Foreign relations concerns explain why both
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-49.
Id. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105 Id.
103

104

10 6

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2) (1987).
107 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(emphasis added).
108 Id.

109 Id. at 172 (distinguishing between private party and government enforcement of
the Sherman Act based on the government's increased self-restraint and consideration of
foreign governmental sensibilities).

1362

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1339

Charming Betsy and the presumption against extraterritoriality protect
against exorbitant enforcement of our laws to police foreign harms.
Most recently, Charming Betsy was used in the case of Spector to
narrowly interpret a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act in light
of international obligations."10 Spector involved a claim that barriers on
foreign cruise ships should be removed to accommodate disabled passengers.
The case did not precisely fit into the presumption against extraterritoriality,
for the foreign cruise ships traversed international and territorial waters.1 11
The Court noted that remedial action under the statute was required only if it
was "readily achievable," that is, if it could be accomplished without "much
difficulty or expense." 12 Significantly, the Court adopted the position of the
United States and interpreted "difficulty" to include considerations other than
cost, finding that "[s]urely a barrier removal requirement ... that would
bring a vessel into noncompliance with ... any ... international legal
obligation would create serious difficulties for the vessel and would have a
substantial impact on its operations." ' "1 3 Conflict with international law was
thus imaginatively imported into a statutory exception to eliminate its
application to foreign vessels and thereby to avoid the potential for
international discord.14
The presumption against extraterritoriality lends further support to
Charming Betsy as a rule to avoid international discord. The confluence of
the two presumptions diminishes the role that congressional directives of
foreign conduct will inadvertently create an adverse impact on foreign
relations. Only when Congress clearly has spoken will courts divine such an
intent.
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2185 (2005) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (plurality opinion).
111 A plurality of the Court nonetheless viewed the clear statement rule applicable in
the case as a near equivalent of the presumption against territoriality. Id. at 2182
(plurality opinion).
112Id at 2180.
113 Id
114 See id. at 2185 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(describing the Court's interpretation as ensuring that the statute "will not provoke
'international discord' of the kind Benz and McCulloch sought to avoid"). The dissent did
not disagree with the importance of avoiding international discord, simply finding that in
the absence of a clear statement, the statute did not apply to foreign-flag vessels. Id. at
2188 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Even if the Court could, by an imaginative interpretation of
Title III, demonstrate that in this particular instance there would be no conflict with the
laws of other nations or with international treaties, it would remain true that a ship's
structure is preeminently part of its internal order; and it would remain true that
subjecting ship structure to multiple national requirements invites conflict." Id. at 2191
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line,
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D. Charming Betsy andExecutive Authority
A conclusion that Charming Betsy is grounded in separation of powers
also underscores its application as a gloss on the scope of executive
authority. It is now accepted that the scope of executive authority depends on
the integration of dispersed powers, with presidential powers fluctuating
5
depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."
Justice Jackson's landmark concurrence in Youngstown delimits
executive authority based on express or implied congressional approval or
disapproval. One might say that Jackson's trilogy is dependent on
congressional intent, with two of the categories relying on implied
understandings for their vitality. The first--"[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress'" 6-is the
Executive's maximalist position, including all he possesses and all Congress
can delegate. The third--"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress"' I 7-is the Executive's
minimalist position, including only that which his own powers confer and
Congress cannot remove.
But rarely can one discern when congressional authorization or
prohibition is implied. Charming Betsy is an oracle to divine implied
congressional intent in the foreign affairs arena. Charming Betsy requires that
congressional action should not be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction is available. 118 This would suggest that under
Youngstown's first category, congressional statutes will rarely implicitly
authorize executive violations of international law, but they may implicitly
authorize executive compliance. Conversely, under Youngstown's third
category, congressional statutes will rarely implicitly prohibit executive
compliance with international law. But such statutes may implicitly prohibit
executive violations. Charming Betsy thus shifts the "twilight zone" of the
middle ground in Youngstown-"[w]hen the President acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority" 1l9-toward international
compliance. For congressional silence is not simply a matter of "inertia,
indifference or quiescence."' 120 It is also a matter of presumption. We
presume Congress is not acting in certain ways, that is, to sanction violations
115 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
116 Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
118 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
119 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
120 Id.
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or prohibit compliance with international law. That presumption inures to the
benefit of the Executive in Youngstown's third prong, for it increases the
arena of sole executive authority to act in compliance with international law,
and imposes an obligation on Congress for a clear statement of prohibition.
But it also narrows the Executive's authority in Youngstown's first prong, by
limiting the scope of authority to act pursuant to an implied congressional
direction inconsistent with international norms.
Put differently, a CharmingBetsy gloss on Youngstown undercuts some
of the significance attributed to Dames & Moore v. Regan, where the Court
construed ambiguous congressional action in the face of longstanding
executive practice to dramatically reshape the Jackson trilogy. 12 1 The
problem of Dames & Moore, as Harold Koh has put it, is that "by treating
ambiguous congressional action as approval for a challenged presidential act,
a court can manipulate almost any act.., into Jackson's category one, where
the president's legal authority would be unassailable."' 122 This may be true
where international law is silent on the question. Presuming, however, that
ambiguous congressional statutes should be interpreted consistent with
international law, the ambit of executive authority is accordingly
circumscribed, thereby shifting some executive authority away from
Youngstown category one toward greater scrutiny under category two or
three.
The facts of Charming Betsy aptly illustrate this point. Absent the
Charming Betsy canon, a modem-day Captain Murray could have invoked
Youngstown to find implicit congressional authorization to seize a Danish
vessel formerly of American provenance. Such a seizure would have been
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, 123 but the CharmingBetsy canon required a clear statement of
statutory authority to act in contravention of international law, something
Captain Murray lacked. To paraphrase Youngstown, the seizure of the Dutch
vessel is "eliminated from the first [category] by admission, for it is
conceded that no congressional authorization exist[ed] for this seizure. ' 124
Nor has Congress clearly prohibited the seizure of the vessel under
Youngstown's third category, for the statute addressed only non-intercourse

121 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-88 (1981).
12 2

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING

POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR 142 (1990).
123 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
124 Id. at 638.
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between American and French vessels. 125 There were not clear "statutory
policies inconsistent with this seizure." 126 As such, Captain Murray finds
himself in the twilight zone of Youngstown's second prong, and his authority
is curtailed, dependent upon the Executive's inherent prerogatives and "the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables.' ' 127 In this twilight
zone, the Court would have given less latitude to executive claims of
authority, recognizing that, "it being

...

a neutral unarmed vessel, [C]aptain

Murray had no right to seize and send her in. A right to search a neutral
arises only from a state of public known war, and not from a municipal
regulation."' 128 As applied to these facts, the Charming Betsy presumption
supplants a Youngstown case of judicial deference based on implied
congressional authority with a more exacting review of executive function in
129
the face ofjudicial challenge and doubt.
This "exacting review" in no way suggests that Youngstown or Charming
Betsy circumscribe the President's inherent authority to violate international
law. As the Court noted in Brown v. United States, although an ambiguous
statute may not authorize conduct in violation of the law of nations, the
President has the inherent authority to do so. 130 Customary international law
is "a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. The rule...
is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be
disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded." 13 1 It simply
suggests that a Charming Betsy gloss on Youngstown may limit implied
congressional authority to violate international law. Of course, in the
execution of core executive powers, whether delegated or inherent, the
President may contravene international law at his discretion. "[U]nder our
[c]onstitutional jurisprudence ... an action by the President ... that is

within... [his] constitutional authority does not become a violation of the
Constitution because the [a]ct places the United States in violation of a treaty

125 The sole reference to neutral vessels in the Non-Intercourse Act was with respect
to neutral vessels securing port clearances without security. Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10,
§ 2, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (expired).
126 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639.
127 Id.at 637.

128 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 72 (1804).
129 Cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 n.3.
130 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
131 Id.; see also Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812);
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For a discussion of international law
being superseded as a rule of decision by a controlling executive act, see William S.
Dodge, The Story of The Paquette Habana: Customary InternationalLaw as Partof Our
Law (Nov. 15, 2005), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=-847847.
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provision or... obligation under customary law."'132
Nor is it to suggest that Congress may not expressly authorize the
President to violate international law. A Charming Betsy gloss on
Youngstown only addresses limits on the implied authority or implied
prohibition consistent with the demands of international law. Of course, if the
purpose of a federal statute is clear, an act of Congress may supersede an
33
earlier rule of international law. 1
This interplay between CharmingBetsy and Youngstown has never been
expressly endorsed by the Court or. identified in detail in the scholarly
literature, 134 but it is inchoately expressed in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
One of the Court's most instructive comments on Charming Betsy's role in
the Youngstown analysis is to be found in the Haitian refugee case of Sale. In
Sale, the Court suggested that had an international treaty imposed an
obligation on the United States to refrain from returning aliens interdicted
outside our territorial waters, then that obligation should inform the statutory
obligation prohibiting deportation and return of an alien to a country that
threatens the alien's life or freedom: "[I]t might be argued that the
extraterritorial obligations imposed by [the Convention] ... were so clear
that Congress ... in amending the statute.., meant to give the... [statute] a
correspondingly extraterritorial effect."' 135 Had the Convention imposed such
an obligation, Youngstown's third category would suggest that Congress
implicitly prohibited executive violations of it. The Court never reached the
question, however, finding no extraterritorial international obligation. 136 As
such, the Court left the Executive with a free-hand to interdict the refugees,
recognizing that such decisions "may involve foreign and military affairs for
which the President has unique responsibility."' 37
The impact of Charming Betsy on Youngstown was more directly
132 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

236

(2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 n.3 (1987); Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 878-85 (1987).
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115(l)(a) (1987).

134 The closest instances come from Jules Lobel, Curtis Bradley, and Jack
Goldsmith. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between
Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1119-20 (1985); see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on

Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2047, 2096-100 (2005).
135 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 (1993).
136 Id. at 178-86.
137 Id.at 188.
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relevant in the recent detainee case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 13 8 The question in
Hamdi was whether the Executive had authority to detain American citizens
who qualify as "enemy combatants" pursuant to congressional authorization
to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks."' 139 Hamdi, an American citizen, objected to the
indefinite detention, but the Court sub silentio applied Charming Betsy to
conclude the detention was authorized by Congress. A plurality of the Court
found that "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law of war that
detention may last no longer than active hostilities" and "we understand
Congress' grant of authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force'
to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and
our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles."'140 Two

other Justices conceded the merit of this position but found it factually
inapposite. 14 1 Thus, six Justices of the Court found implicit congressional
authority to detain enemy combatants within the parameters of international
law. Charming Betsy's gloss on Youngstown was dispositive in finding
implicit statutory authority to detain Hamdi consistent with the laws of war.
International law was the accepted background norm against which Congress
42
legislated. 1
The same could be said for the recent case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.143 In
addressing whether there was statutory authority permitting the President to
convene military commissions, the Court read international law principles
138 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (plurality opinion). For a detailed
discussion of the application of CharmingBetsy to the case of Hamdi, see Wuerth, supra
note 86, at 330-57.
139 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635, 2639.

140 Id. at 2641 (emphasis added).
Justices Souter and Ginsburg reasoned that "there is one argument for treating
the Force Resolution as sufficiently clear to authorize detention of a citizen" but the
"Government is in no position to claim its advantage." Id. at 2657 (Souter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment). Conceding the potential merit in
the argument that "if the usages of war are fairly authorized by the Force Resolution,
Hamdi's detention is authorized," they nonetheless concluded that the Executive had not
"made out its claim that in detaining Hamdi in the manner described, it [was] acting in
accord with the laws of war authorized to be applied against citizens by the Force
Resolution." Id. at 2657, 2659. These Justices joined the plurality for purposes of giving
practical effect to the judgment in order to remand on terms closest to those they would
impose. Id. at 2660.
142 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism:
InternationalLaw, ClearStatement Requirements, and ConstitutionalDesign, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 2683, 2685 (2005); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 134, at 2089-9 1.
143 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
141
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into the relevant statutes. "Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at
most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene military
commissions in circumstances where justified under the 'Constitution and
laws,' including the laws of war."'14 4 Those statutes were interpreted as
limiting the delegated authority of the President to act outside the parameters
of the laws of war.
E. Charming Betsy and JudicialAuthority
A conclusion that Charming Betsy is grounded in separation of powers
also underscores its potential application as a gloss on the scope of judicial
authority. Judicial authority depends on prudential doctrines of justiciability,
and the judicial branch circumscribes its authority for matters that are
deemed political rather than legal questions. The political question doctrine
holds that the judiciary should not speak to issues that are not by their nature
subject to judicial determination. Foreign relations cases are particularly
sensitive to such political question analysis.
In one sense, one could argue that Charming Betsy is a particularly bad
case to address the political question doctrine, because the specific grant of
jurisdiction in Article III to the judiciary over admiralty and maritime
questions 14 5 guaranteed a grant of jurisdiction that freed the Court from
concerns that the decision made may be contrary to the political wishes of the
political branches. 14 6 In another sense, the case provides a useful heuristic
precisely because it implicates congressional regulation of foreign commerce
and naval forces, executive branch prosecution of naval war, and the judicial
resolution of individual rights-all core functions of the three branches.
In delineating what constitutes a political question, courts are
admonished under Baker v. Carr to consider, among other things, whether
deciding the case will have the potential "of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.' 4 7
This prong of the political question analysis
implies both the presence of an outside entity and a framework of
responsibility; one cannot be embarrassed except in relation to others, and
one is not embarrassed for anything for which one does not feel responsible.
In this case the 'others' are foreign countries, and the responsibility has

144 Id. at 2775.
145 U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases of

admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ... ").
146 Cf Lavinbuk, supra note 19, at 877-78.
147 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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14 8
been imposed by international law.

Charming Betsy and the political question doctrine are thus corollary
principles founded upon the separation of powers doctrine. The former
admonishes the courts to avoid interpretations that might authorize executive
violations of international obligations, for doing otherwise will engender
international discord; the latter admonishes the courts to avoid altogether
interpreting statutes that authorize executive action in the international arena
if doing so will engender emlzarrassment through discordant
pronouncements. Both seek "respectability in the eyes of foreign powers as a
safeguard against foreign encroachments."' 149 Both advance on the horizontal
plane the federalist desire that other nations find us "firmly united under one
national Government" not "split into three ... discordant" branches "played

off against each other."' 150 The political question doctrine avoids foreign
embarrassment for the Executive's political acts; Charming Betsy avoids
foreign embarrassment for the Executive's legal acts.
The embarrassment factor is greatly diminished if one can presume that
the courts will endeavor to interpret the statute to authorize international
compliance and avoid non-compliance. That is, applying this rule of
construction will diminish the likelihood of foreign embarrassment. As the
Court put it in Curtiss, if "embarrassment ... is to be avoided" in our

international relations then "congressional legislation ...must often accord
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.' 15 1
Charming Betsy is one such limit on executive discretion acting under
implied authority, imposed to avoid international friction.
The Court's analysis of the political question doctrine in Japan Whaling
is illustrative. In finding no political question, the Court noted that:
[w]e are cognizant of the interplay between these Amendments and the
conduct of this Nation's foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role
which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. But under the
Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,

148 Peter Spiro, Globalization and the (ForeignAffairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 649, 680 (2002).
149 THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).

150 THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay). Jay was speaking of federalist concerns of
discordant republics each played off against the other; but the concerns for a firmly
united national government likewise demand that we avoid inter-branch discord.
151 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may
152
have significant political overtones.
In interpreting the statutory regime, the Court avoided precisely the
foreign embarrassments that are a factor in Baker. The statute imposed
sanctions on nations that violated whaling quotas established by international
convention. The Court refused to construe the statute to require sanctions
against Japan, recognizing that Japan had lawfully opted out of such quotas
153
and was therefore not in violation of its international obligations.
Although never expressly referring to Charming Betsy, the statute was
construed to grant executive discretion to mitigate its response to nonconforming countries that are nonetheless acting in compliance with
international law. The statute was interpreted to permit Japan to lawfully opt
154
out of international quotas without fear of sanction by the United States.
To conclude otherwise would engender embarrassment for the Executive by
mandating a statutory remedy for conduct that was not an international
wrong.
Charming Betsy thus simplifies the judicial understanding of the
distinction between political versus legal questions. Since the time of
Marbury v. Madison, the distinction has always been made between
conclusive executive discretion over political subjects that "respect the
nation, not individual rights" as compared to judicial scrutiny of the "rights
of individuals [that] are dependent on the performance of [executive]
acts." 155 By interpreting a statute to avoid political consequences in
deference to separation of powers concerns, the judiciary may be more
inclined to seize hold of certain cases but address only legal and individual
questions.
For example, the recent Ninth Circuit case, Alperin v. Vatican Bank,
made the distinction between Holocaust property claims and "war
objectives" claims-a distinction not made by the parties-and concluded
156
that the former were justiciable while the latter were political questions.
The property claims were treated as "garden-variety legal and equitable
claims for the recovery of property,"' 157 while the other war claims required
the court to "intrud[e] unduly on certain policy choices and value judgments
that are constitutionally committed to [the political branches,]" such as
152 Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
153 Id. at 232-33.
154 Id.
155 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
156 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 548 (9th Cir. 2005).
157 Id.
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whether to prosecute the Vatican Bank for war crimes. 158 Although not
expressly construing the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, Alperin's
framework suggests that human rights claims under that statute will have a
greater likelihood of success if they are narrowly-tailored, individualized,
depoliticized, and avoid national questions of executive policy-making.
Certainly the language in Sosa is suggestive of such a cautious approach:
"[s]ince many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of
new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution."' 159
III. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Thus far this Article has sought to establish that Charming Betsy has a
venerable role in statutory interpretation. That veneration has engendered
enthusiasm for its application to the constitutional context. Advocates now
contend that foreign relations concerns should inform our interpretation of
constitutional guarantees. While such concerns are well founded in matters
pertaining to foreign relations clauses of the Constitution, there is little basis
to support the transplanting of a doctrine founded on separation of powers to
the protection of constitutional liberties. To argue that constitutional
guarantees must be interpreted to take account of foreign policy objections
from our friends and allies presumes a greater role for foreign affairs in our
constitutional system than is permitted. Foreign relations is an endogenous
factor invoked by our political branches, not an exogenous concern our
judiciary applies in addressing the scope of constitutional liberties.
A. Charming Betsy andForeignRelations Clauses
The concerns that advance a strong role for foreign relations in statutory
interpretation are concerns for separation of powers. In a similar vein,
structural guarantees in the Constitution that relate to foreign relations are
likewise informed by a generous spirit of cooperation and compliance with
our international obligations. To avoid international discord, compliance with
international obligations is assumed for what may be called "foreign relations
clauses"--provisions of the Constitution that "directly appeal[] to matters of
international relations such as declaring war, making treaties, and enforcing
the law of nations." 160 These provisions textually anticipate that foreign

158 Id. at 560.
159 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004).
160 Ramsey, supra note 5, at 71.
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relations concerns will inform our constitutional understanding. 161
For example, the nature of the treaty power indicates a peculiar
intermixture of executive and legislative powers, relating neither to the
execution of subsisting laws, nor to the enactment of new ones, but rather to
the establishment of "contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of
law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith."' 162 The participation of
both the legislative and executive branches in the making of treaties is
required because the Executive can "enjoy the confidence and respect of
foreign powers" and is the "most fit agent" in the "management of foreign
negotiations" but the "vast importance of the trust, and the operation of
treaties as laws" plead strongly for participation by the Legislature. 16 3 In the
delicate matter of foreign relations, the Constitution establishes structural
safeguards to produce efficacy in treaty negotiations by presuming fidelity in
treaty compliance. 164
factor in
Likewise, compliance with international law was a critical
165
treaties.
make
to
power
the
States
several
the
from
removing
[J]ust causes of war.. . arise either from violation of treaties, or from direct
violence ....It is of high importance to the peace of America, that she
observe the laws of nations towards all ... [plowers [to which we have
entered treaties], and ... it appears evident that this will be more perfectly
and punctually done by one national [g]ovemment, than it could be ...by
16 6
thirteen separate States.

The states could not be trusted to remain faithful to treaty obligations to
the same degree as the national government, and the breaching of such
treaties could precipitate a just war against the United States. 16 7 As such,
states "parted with the power of making treaties," leaving the national
government exclusively empowered with the "right to make peace" and
161 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L.
L. 1, 12-33 (2006); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of InternationalLaw in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82-83 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998); Michael D.
Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002) [hereinafter
Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers].
162 THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
163 Id.
164 Id.

165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation.").

166 THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay) (omission of emphasis).
167 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 235-38 (1796) (discussing Virginia's
refusal to honor Jay Treaty obligations with respect to British creditors).
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determine the terms of peace, with any state's laws that work a violation of a
treaty "prostrated before the treaty."' 168 International peace required
compliance with treaties, and compliance was enhanced by structural
constraints on the authority to enter such arrangements. Even with these
constraints, state compliance with federal treaties has remained difficult.
Indeed, one of the singular failures of George Washington's Administration
was its inability to secure state compliance with peace treaties established
169
with the Indians and the British.
The war power is perhaps the most obvious example of the structural
safeguards established by the Constitution to facilitate compliance with
international law. Thus, even a skeptical scholar such as John Yoo happily
admits that "[t]he Framers turned to international law to define phrases such
as to 'declare war' because it was international law (and international
politics) which gave these powers meaning.' 170 In eighteenth-century
practice, a declaration of war "serve[d] as a warning to subjects and neutrals
of the existence of a state of war, and thus the applicability of the
international laws of war" including those "relating to seizure of persons and
property."' 17 1 The facts of Charming Betsy are a particularly evocative
example of the importance of this power; the undeclared war between the
United States and France left neutral vessels like the Charming Betsy in a
state of uncertainty as to their status under the non-intercourse law.' 72 The
obligation to interpret the statute to avoid violations of the law of nations
recognized that international obligations change upon a declaration of war:
Incident to a state of war is the right to search and seize neutral vessels in

168 Id.at 236-37.
169 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, His EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 213-14 (2004); Ware,

3 U.S. 199.
170 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original

Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167, 244 (1996). As Chief Justice
Marshall has found,
[i]n expounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted
which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not possess
elsewhere, and which would fetter that exercise of entire discretion respecting
enemy property, which may enable the government to apply to the enemy the rule
that he applies to us.
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 125 (1814).
171 Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, supra note 161, at 1586.
172 The international laws of war recognized that neutral vessels could only be
searched and seized in the event of a declared state of war. Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 70 (1804).
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appropriate circumstances. 17 3 In short, a declaration of war alters the
international obligations of the United States vis-A-vis neutral commerce and
neutral vessels. 174 The power of Congress to declare war liberates the
President to take action that international law might otherwise proscribe, and
the judicious use of this legislative power broadens executive authority to act
consistent with international law. 175 The constitutional authority to declare
war, however, does not vest in Congress a power to authorize executive
176
action inconsistent with the powers recognized by the laws of war.
These examples illustrate how structural safeguards have been
constitutionally established to address foreign relations concerns, such as the
war power and the treaty-making power. Compliance with international law
is of presumed importance in establishing these structural safeguards, and
one may well argue that courts should avoid interpretations of constitutional
provisions, such as the treaty-making power or the war-making power, that
undermine the ability of the Executive to conduct foreign affairs consistent
with international obligations.

173 Id. at 121-22. If the neutral vessel is armed, for example, then it could be in a
condition to interfere with American commerce. In the case of CharmingBetsy, there was
only one musket on board, so its "capacity ... for offence appear[ed] not sufficient to
warrant the capture of her as an armed vessel." Id. at 121.
174 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1863) ("To legitimate the capture
of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war must exist defacto, and the neutral
must have a knowledge or notice of the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use
this mode of coercion .. ")
175 Id. at 671 (noting that laws of war justify allegedly unconstitutional
congressional ratification of Lincoln's blockade of ports in possession of States in
rebellion); see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
16 (1946); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640-41, 2651-52 (2004).
176 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 125 (1814). The Court stated:
It may be considered as the opinion of all who have written on thejus belli, that
war gives the right to confiscate, but does not itself confiscate the property of the
enemy; and their rules go to the exercise of this right.
The constitution of the United States was framed at a time when this rule,
introduced by commerce in favor of moderation and humanity, was received
throughout the civilized world. In expounding that constitution, a construction ought
not lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this
country it does not possess elsewhere, and which would fetter that exercise of entire
discretion respecting enemy property, which may enable the government to apply to
the enemy the rule that he applies to us.
Id.; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666, 670-74.
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B. Charming Betsy and Individual Rights
While presumed compliance with international law in structural foreign
relations clauses is uncontroversial, advocates of a constitutional Charming
Betsy are not principally concerned with such issues. They contend that
individual rights enshrined in the Constitution should be read consistent with
international norms in furtherance of foreign relations concerns. This vests
the Charming Betsy doctrine with the ambitious role of presuming an
interpretation of constitutional liberties consistent with international norms
simply to make the diplomat's brief more palatable to foreign sensibilities.
Rather than burden executive officials with the task of defending American
exceptionalism-which of course is exceptional in granting lesser and greater
civil liberties'77-it is far better to conflate constitutional norms with
international standards.
In the Eighth Amendment context, for example, advocates have argued
that executing juveniles or the mentally retarded would further the United
States' diplomatic isolation and harm its foreign policy interests. 178 Scholars
such as Harold Koh writing on behalf of American diplomats have argued:
The United States is needlessly placed on the defensive in diplomatic
missions. Instead of focusing on advancing U.S. interests, U.S. diplomats
abroad are increasingly called into meetings to answer foreign criticisms of
the death penalty .... The persistence of this practice ... has allowed allies
and adversaries alike to challenge the United States' claim to moral
authority in the domain of international human rights. Such challenges
deflect attention away from serious human rights violations in other
countries that have exhibited far worse human rights records .... [T]his
continuing state practice seriously disserves this nation's broader foreign
policy objectives and undermines this nation's leadership role in the
world. 179

The remarkable theory of such a position is that capital punishment
Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-27 (2005).
178 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici
Curiae, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL
648607 at *12; Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici
Curiae, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448 at
*20-26. The briefs were filed on behalf of Morton Abramowitz, Stephen W. Bosworth,
Stuart E. Eizenstat, John C. Komblum, Phyllis E. Oakley, Thomas R. Pickering, Felix G.
Rohatyn, J. Stapleton Roy, and Frank G. Wisner.
179 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) at *23-26
177

(citations omitted).
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"strains diplomatic relations with close American allies, increases America's
diplomatic isolation, and impairs U.S. foreign policy interests," and that such
"considerations should lead the Court to hold that the practice" offends the
Eighth Amendment. 180 A Charming Betsy gloss on the Eighth Amendment
empowers diplomatic demariches to have constitutional relevance in
interpreting the scope of constitutional guarantees. Geopolitical ends justify a
8
generic constitution neutralized to sustain international equilibrium.' '
Of course, these diplomats are not alone. Justice Blackmun famously
argued that it "is appropriate to remind ourselves that the United States is
part of the global community... and that courts should construe our statutes,
our treaties, and our Constitution, where possible, consistently with the
'customs and usages of civilized nations."'' 182 Renowned statesmen likewise
have expressed their support for a constitutional Charming Betsy. In the
recent juvenile death penalty case of Roper v. Simmons, 183 seventeen Nobel
Peace laureates-representing perhaps the most illustrious group of persons
to ever submit an amicus brief before the Supreme Court184-cited Charming
Betsy for the proposition that "[t]his Court always has maintained that United
States courts must construe domestic law so as to avoid violating principles
of international law."' 8 5 The brief went on to argue:
By continuing to execute child offenders in violation of international norms,
the United States is not just leaving itself open to charges of hypocrisy, but
also is endangering the rights of many around the world. Countries whose
human rights records are criticized by the United States have no incentive to
improve their records when the United States fails to meet the most

180 Koh, supra note 8, at 1120 (explaining theory behind amicus briefs he filed on
behalf of American diplomats).
181 Alford, supra note 177, at 22-23.
182 Blackmun, supra note 1, at 49 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700

(1900)).
183 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
184 Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446.

The brief was filed on behalf of Nobel Peace laureates President James Earl Carter, Jr.,
President Frederik Willem De Klerk, President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
President Oscar Arias Sanchez, President Lech Walesa, Shirin Ebadi, Adolfo Perez
Esquivel, the Dalai Lama, Mairead Corrigan Maguire, Dr. Joseph Rotblat, Archbishop

Desmond Tutu, Betty Williams, Jody Williams, American Friends Service Committee,
Amnesty International, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and
the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.
185 Id. at 5.
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86
fundamental, base-line standards.]

Other scholars have made analogous arguments. For example, Daniel
Bodansky has argued that we should look to international materials because
it
helps avoid friction with the rest of [the] world .... The policy interest in
avoiding friction with the rest of the world is reflected in the Charming
Betsy doctrine, which states that, wherever possible, statutes, and
presumably the Constitution as well, should be construed so as to be
187
consistent with international norms.
While a traditional role for Charming Betsy has a firm structural
justification, the novel suggestion of a constitutional Charming Betsy is far
more troublesome. In its essence it suggests that executive authority requires
judicial deference to foreign relations concerns in constitutional
interpretation. It assumes that our allies will demand compliance with
international law and constitutional interpretation makes room for such
concerns. In short, a concern for the executive foreign affairs power begets a
concern for international uniformity and compliance, which begets a judicial
presumption of harmony between constitutional and international norms.
Thus, the tail of international diplomacy is wagging the dog of constitutional
guarantees.
The difficulty with a constitutional CharmingBetsy is that there is little
textual, historical, decisional, or theoretical support for a position that takes
international discord into account in interpreting the content of individual
liberties so as harmonize those liberties with international norms.
Regarding textual support for a foreign relations reading of individual
liberties, proponents of a constitutional Charming Betsy have offered none.
That is, nowhere have they established any textual support for the suggestion
that constitutional liberties should be read consistent with international law in
order to facilitate the executive branch's efficacious conduct in foreign
relations. Indeed, neither the original Constitution, nor the Bill of Rights, nor
the Reconstruction Amendments provide any hint that such concerns will be
a factor in interpreting individual liberties.' 88 There is simply no textually
demonstrable commitment to suffuse constitutional liberties with a "decent
respect" for international opinion in order to facilitate executive action
186 Id. at 29.
187 Daniel Bodansky, The Use of InternationalSources in Constitutional Opinion,
32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427 (2004).
188 Of course, foreign affairs concerns have long been considered by the Court to
justify curtailment of individual liberties. See infra text accompanying notes 225-36.
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abroad. As Louis Henkin has noted, "[n]one of the provisions in the Bill of
Rights has particular relevance for U.S. foreign relations; all of its provisions
might impinge on foreign relations in some contexts." 18 9 That is, the Bill of
Rights is not infused with foreign relations concerns, although its protections
may at times implicate them.
One of the few clear textual references to foreign affairs in the Bill of
Rights pertains to the Second Amendment, which provides that "[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' 190 Article II in turn
vests in the President the power as commander-in-chief "of the militia of the
several States" to call state militia into "service of the United States."' 19 1
Early constitutional commentators understood the executive power to wage
war depended on the individual right to bear arms. 192 In the absence of a
standing army, this individual right safeguarded a federal power. Of course,
such an individual right is secured not to appease foreign sentiments in the
halls of diplomacy but rather to defend against foreign encroachments in the
theater of war.
More broadly, one might say that a distrust of foreign powers-in
particular securing a common front against Europe-was a key factor in the
decision to include a Bill of Rights at all. As Akhil Amar recently put it,
national security was a principal motivation in the adoption of the Bill of
Rights:
Co-opting the opposition agenda could ... help achieve national

cohesion and enhance national security. A thoughtfully drafted set of
amendments could both cement the loyalty of Anti-Federalists across the
continent and woo North Carolina and Rhode Island back into the
union ....
When Madison... tried to explain the urgency of amendment to
his colleagues, he stressed not just the intrinsic propriety of a [B]ill of
[R]ights, but also its usefulness as an olive branch to those who had
189 HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supranote 132, at 285.
190 U.S. CONST. amend. II. Other references to war in the Third and Fifth
Amendments address executive authority in foreign affairs, but these references simply
allow for an exceptional curtailment of individual rights in times of war. U.S. CONST.
amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."); U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger").
191 U.S. CONST. art. I1,§ 2, cl. 1.
192 Department of Justice: Office of Legal Counsel, Whether the Second Amendment
Secures an Individual Right (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf.
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19 3
opposed-and in two states were still opposing-the Constitution.

A newly formed union that did not include Rhode Island, and more
importantly North Carolina, was a strategically insecure one that would not
achieve the Preamble's objective of providing for the common defense
against foreign invasion. 19 4 It was fear of foreign power, not affection for
foreign opinion, which was the great international influence on the
establishment of the Bill of Rights.
Internationalists fare no better when they search for historical support for
a broader reading of foreign relations into the meat and sinews of the Bill of
Rights. Of course, one can find strong support for the notion that the
proposed amendments reflected inalienable rights derived from natural law in
the original congressional debates. At the time, "[m]ost written enumeration
of rights ...were thought to be declarations rather than enactments of the
listed rights."' 195 Consistent with this notion, early discussions by the framers
and decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon comparative and
international experiences to elucidate an understanding of the natural law
underpinnings of the Constitution. 196 As Suzanna Sherry has noted, "[w]here
the allocation of power among parts of the government was not at issue," the
law of nations elided with notions of natural law such that the Court "referred
almost indiscriminately to the constitution ...natural law, ancient custom,
and inalienable rights."'197 To the extent the early Court viewed the law of
nations as a proxy for natural law, one can find numerous instances98 in which
international law and practice informed the Court's jurisprudence.1
But the constitutional Charming Betsy does not advance reliance on
318 (2005).
194 Professor Amar provided this insight in a private discussion of his book
193 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CoNsTrTUTIoN: A BIOGRAPHY

AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY. More generally on the importance of unity

over disunity to the future national security of the fledgling nation, see THE FEDERALIST
No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) ("If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may for
ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation [of Great Britain] ....
But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or
which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we
should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of
").
Europe ....
195 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 313 (2d ed. 2005).

196 Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52

UCLA L. REv. 639, 660-62 (2005); Philip A. Hamburger, NaturalRights, Natural Law,
and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 907-08 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1134-46 (1987).
197 Sherry, supra note 196, at 1135.
198 Alford, supra note 196, at 659-62.
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international opinion as reflective of the natural order of things. It suggests
that constitutional guarantees should be interpreted consistent with
international opinion in order to facilitate the Executive's performance in
foreign affairs. That proposition finds no support in the seminal "natural
law/law of nations" cases of the early Court. Indeed, very few decisions ever
reached the Court in its first one hundred years addressing federal actions
which offended the Bill of Rights, 199 and therefore one can scarcely test the
proposition of a foreign relations interpretation of constitutional liberties.
As for modern decisional support, one can find numerous instances in
which the Supreme Court has rendered decisions that confound any notion of
a constitutional Charming Betsy. One searches in vain for signs that the
Court's appraisal of foreign relations concerns is relevant in the adjudication
of constitutional liberties. Most obvious is the line of cases addressing the
Constitution abroad.
In some cases, the United States has signed a treaty with other countries
to curtail individual rights. A presumption that constitutional liberties should
be read consistent with international law would seek, wherever possible, to
reconcile the international obligations with constitutional demands. In Reid v.
Covert, the United States signed an executive agreement with the United
Kingdom to try and punish American servicemen and their dependents in
military courts. 2 00 The Court discounted the importance of any international
discord that might be engendered from a finding that an executive agreement
violated constitutional guarantees. 20 1 It dismissed out of hand the United
States' argument that the executive agreement was necessary and proper to
carry out the United States' international obligations. 202
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rightslet alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In
effect, such construction would permit amendment of that document in a
manner not sanctioned by Article V. 2 03
But of course, a constitutional CharmingBetsy might have attempted to
interpret the constitutional guarantees to minimize international discord by

199 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST

HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 439 (1985).
200 Id.
201

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).

202 Id. at 16.
203

Id. at 17.
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finding, consistent with Supreme Court practice prior thereto, 204 that the
Constitution constrains the United States government only when it acts
within the borders of the United States. 20 5 Such an approach would have
upheld the executive agreement in furtherance of efficacious executive
branch foreign affairs conduct.
206
in
Most significantly, the Court's reaffirmation of Kerr v. Illinois
2 07 illustrates the Court's potential for insensitivity to
Alvarez-Machain
international law concerns in matters of constitutional interpretation. While
scholars have suggested a colorable due process claim arising from the
conduct at issue in that case, 20 8 the Court narrowly interpreted the extradition
treaty with Mexico and virtually ignored customary international law. As the
Court put it, the abduction of Alvarez-Machain "may be in violation of
general international law principles ... [but] the decision of whether
respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is
a matter for the executive branch. '20 9 A CharmingBetsy approach may have
attempted to construe the obligations with greater sensitivity to international
obligations and foreign sensibilities, as espoused in detail in Justice Stevens'
2 10
dissent.
Even in those instances when one might construe a decision as consistent
with a constitutional CharmingBetsy approach, the result is not necessarily
21
felicitous to the promotion of individual rights. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 1
the Constitution was interpreted consistent with customary international law
to broadly confer on the executive branch the authority to detain, try, and
punish enemy combatants before military tribunals without the constitutional
protection of federal court review.
The jurisdiction of military authorities... to punish those guilty of offenses
against the laws of war is long-established ....Certainly it is not the
204 See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
205 This is what has been described as the territorial model of constitutionalism. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (finding that no decision of the
Court supports a view of the extraterritorial application of organic law); Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 918 (1991).
206 Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (rejecting due process argument and
holding that "such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not
answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him
for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court").
207 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
208 HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supranote 132, at 305.
209
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669.
210 Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation ... which challenges
the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in
2 12
sending our armed forces abroad ....
A constitutional Charming Betsy approach would sustain this
withholding of constitutional liberties to nonresident aliens consistent with
the laws of war.
The

case

of United States v.

Verdugo-Urquidez2 13

is

similarly

problematic in terms of applying a constitutional Charming Betsy. If the
concern is to avoid international discord in constitutional interpretation by
interpreting constitutional liberties consistent with international law, what is
the Court to make of extraterritorial action by the United States in concert
with Mexican authorities that potentially runs afoul of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment right? One is hard-pressed to conclude that international law
would require the exclusion of evidence that was the fruit of an unreasonable
search and seizure. 2 14 Our Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is
"distinctively American" and has been "universally rejected" elsewhere. 2 15
One is even harder pressed to conclude that the Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment does not promote international harmony among
interested states. The investigation and prosecution of criminal networks
involved in matters such as international terrorism and drug trafficking
assume a different standard for intelligence gathering abroad than at home.
The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez recognized as much, stating that "[i]f there
are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such
American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation. 2 16 How does a
constitutional Charming Betsy provide particular protections to individual
liberties when such search and seizures are in want of international law and
in demand by cooperating enforcement authorities?
Nor is the constitutional CharmingBetsy supported by sound theory. The
great theoretical problem with the proposed constitutional CharmingBetsy is
that it is a pragmatic approach that makes false assumptions that are
inconsistent with the likely results that will obtain in varied and frequently
unknown factual contexts.
212 Id.at 786, 789.

213 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
214 For a discussion of potential international law standards for search and seizure,
see Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an InternationalFourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches
and Seizures Abroad after Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329 (1994).
215 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting

Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375, 399-400 (2001)).
216 Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 275.
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First, why do proponents of a constitutional Charming Betsy assume that
international protests will only come in the form of demands for compliance
2 17
with international human rights law? The case frequently (and incorrectly)
cited in support of a constitutional Charming Betsy is Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,2 18 despite the fact that it involved judicial
cognizance of foreign protests against a state law that sought enhanced
protection of fundamental international human rights in Burma. Certainly,
the United States is subject to diplomatic protests regarding capital
punishment, albeit in the absence of international obligations on the question.
But it also is sharply criticized for unduly protecting hate speech, and for
promoting human rights through civil litigation in the United States, through
the embrace of exorbitant jurisdiction over foreign defendants, and the use of
liberal evidentiary and procedural rules that enhance the redress of
international wrongs. These practices also "strain ... diplomatic relations
with close American allies [and] increase ...
America's diplomatic
isolation." 2 19 If the Eighth Amendment is interpreted in light of the national
interest in avoiding international discord, should the First Amendment and
the procedural Due Process Clause be likewise so interpreted?

Second, why do proponents of a constitutional Charming Betsy
assume that the executive preference will be to appease the international
protests? If the import of the doctrine is to clear constitutional

impediments that "impair [] U.S. foreign policy interests," 220 what if the
national

interest

is

discordant

with

foreign

sentiments?

Does

the

presumption counsel deference to the executive policy preference, or does
it accord relevance to the competing foreign protests? For example, in
217 Incorrectly, because Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, addresses the
structural concerns of federalism and preemption, and not concerns for constitutional
liberties. 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000). In Crosby, the state law compromised the
capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments. We need not get into any general consideration of limits of state action
affecting foreign affairs to realize that the President's maximum power to persuade
rests on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national
economy without exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent
political tactics.
Id. at 381. Foreign protests simply underscored the threat the state law posed "to the
President's power to speak and bargain effectively with other nations." Id.
218 Id. at 382-83; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Morton Abramowitz et al. as
Amici Curiae, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001
WL 648607 at *13; Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici
Curiae, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448 at *20.
219 Koh, supra note 8, at 1120.
220 Id.
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Barclays Bank, many governments expressed strong disapproval of the
method of California's taxation on foreign corporations, 22 1 but the United
States disagreed, concluding that California had brought its law into
acceptable harmony with federal and international tax practice. 22 2 The
Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's tax laws-in large part on
finding a federal policy of acquiescence to the state tax law-and advised the
foreign governments to direct their threats of retaliatory action to the political
branches. 22 3 "The judiciary is not vested with power to decide 'how to
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the
2 24
United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.'
Even more difficult for a constitutional Charming Betsy are those rare
situations when the executive branch finds it in the national interest to violate
international law. Although the facts of Alvarez-Machain were exceptional,
less intrusive encroachments on territorial sovereignty are not uncommon,
such as extraterritorial police and intelligence investigations, which may be
viewed as a violation of international law in the absence of state consent. It is
undeniable that the United States faces serious threats to its domestic security
from international criminal organizations, and foreign governments' failure
to interdict such predations may occasion extraterritorial law enforcement
investigations, with or without foreign state consent. It is noteworthy that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which must regularly investigate foreign
criminal activities, sought guidance from the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel on whether the Fourth Amendment required compliance with
international law. The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that it did not,
finding that "[i]t would be contrary to the Fourth Amendment's purpose to
2 25
incorporate into it rules of international law or analogous foreign statutes."
If the gravamen of the constitutional Charming Betsy is to interpret the
Constitution, whenever possible, to advance effective pursuit of foreign
affairs, in exceptional circumstances this may actually facilitate noncompliance with international law.
Finally, the constitutional Charming Betsy's most obvious error is the
221 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 324 n.22 (1994).
222 Id. at 330 n.32; Brief for the Respondent, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (No. 92-1384), 1994 WL 135983 at *2 ("The Solicitor
General has reported to this Court that those amendments "have brought that State's law
into acceptable harmony with federal and international 'arm's length' tax practice.").
223 Barclays, 512 U.S. at 327-28.
224 Id. at 328.
225 Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override International Law
in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163, 182
(1989); see also Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 551-54 (1980).
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judicial usurpation of political branch authority and obligation to conduct
foreign affairs. The courts fail to show proper deference to the political
branches when they make an independent appraisal of the importance of
foreign protests to the conduct of our nation's foreign policy under the guise
of constitutional interpretation. Aberrant practices and international isolation
may indeed engender diplomatic difficulties for our political leaders. History
has proven that our country's leaders are more than capable of defending our
record on fundamental rights. Surely the proper response to such protests is
not, as Justice Blackmun suggested, 22.1 for the courts to turn every
constitutional question into an international referendum. Constitutional
guarantees cannot wax and wane depending on the ebb and flow of allied
alarm.
C. The ProperRole for ForeignRelations
If a constitutional Charming Betsy is inappropriate to delineate the
content of constitutional liberties, what role, if any, should foreign relations
play? If a foreign relations concern does not define constitutional guarantees,
does it offer any illumination on the contours of constitutional law?
The answer, in brief, is that foreign relations concerns play a traditional
and central role in justifying government authority to curtail constitutional
liberties. From the perspective of constitutional guarantees, its role is thus
almost always negative, by which the Government asserts the need to
diminish individual liberties in furtherance of legitimate government ends.
Far from securing freedoms consistent with international norms, foreign
relations concerns circumscribe constitutional liberties consistent with
reasonable political ends. A constitutional CharmingBetsy presumes that the
courts will attempt to interpret constitutional liberties consistent with
international law so as to liberate the executive branch in the conduct of
foreign affairs; but instead, constitutional interpretation frequently requires
courts to interpret constitutional liberties in light of asserted executive
foreign affairs demands that may conflict (or perhaps coincide) with the
demands of international law. As the United States recently put it, "[i]n
matters touching on foreign relations ...Executive authority is at its apogee
and judicial expertise at its nadir ....[T]he Constitution ...should not be

construed to disrupt the ability of that Branch 'to respond to foreign
situations involving our national interest."'' 227 A judicial reluctance to
226 See supra text accompanying note 14.

227 Brief for the Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03485), 2004 WL 182582 at *49-50, (citing Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948); Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988); Haig v. Agee,
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independently take foreign policy considerations into account absent
executive guidance reflects the classic deference the courts must show to the
political branches in the conduct of foreign affairs. Political branches, not the
courts, should invoke an international rule. Such political acceptance
"reduces possible concerns that a court might improperly impose an
international obligation on the United States contrary to the views of the
228
political branches."
Supreme Court jurisprudence is replete with such examples. 229 In the due
process context, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge held that the process due
in any given instance is determined by weighing the private interest affected
by official action against the government's asserted interest and the burdens
it would face in providing greater process. 230 That test was applied in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld to balance the government interest in detaining American enemy
combatants, noting that "the law of war and the realities of combat may
render ... detentions both necessary and appropriate, and our due process
analysis need not blink at those realities." 23 1 That is, international law
recognizes the need to detain American enemy combatants, and our
Constitution is solicitous to such concerns. Our Constitution recognizes the
ability to deny liberty to enemy combatants is among the core strategic
matters of war-making that belong in the hands of the Executive. 232 Thus, the
foreign relations interest competes for prominence with the private interest in
Hamdi's individual right to liberty.
Similarly, aliens enjoy far fewer protections under our Constitution
because of important foreign relations considerations:
Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the
war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government
233
as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
In times of war and peace, such concerns have resulted in the Court
453 U.S. 280, 292-94 (1981); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274
(1990)).
228 Cleveland, supra note 161, at 116.
229 See Spiro, supra note 148, at 697-715 (discussing foreign relations' impact on
individual rights).
230 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
231 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004).
232

Id.

233 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)) (internal quotation omitted).
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upholding the detention, exclusion, and deportation of aliens. 2 34 Whatever
constitutional rights resident and non-resident aliens may enjoy on such
matters, the government enjoys near plenary power over aliens on such
immigration and war-making matters. It seems the government almost
always wins on matters pertaining to the treatment of aliens.
In some instances the foreign relations interest will counsel a curtailment
of individual liberties in furtherance of international obligations. Reid v.
Covert is an example, with executive agreements authorizing the military
prosecution of civilian dependents without the constitutional protections of
indictment and trial by jury. The United States argued that such prosecutions
were "necessary and proper to carry out the United States' obligations under
international agreements." 2 35 Likewise in Boos v. Barry, the Government
sought to limit speech near embassy properties to further the government's
interest in complying with international law obligations regarding the
protection of diplomatic and consular personnel. The Court recognized that
"the United States has a vital national interest in complying with
international law" and "[t]he need to protect diplomats is grounded in our
Nation's important interest in international relations." 2 36 In neither case did
the Court uphold the government restriction; rather, it decided not to do so
because the national interest, while important, ran afoul of the protected
237
constitutional interest.

Perhaps the point is more obvious if one takes a domestic analogy. One
year after the decision in Boos v. Barry, the Court relied on Boos in the case
of Texas v. Johnson, which upheld the right to desecrate the flag
notwithstanding the "serious offense" it would cause to others. 2 38 The Court
held that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."'2 39 The Court
has not recognized an exception to this principle when such offense is
expressed with a foreign accent. It is the very nature of principled
234 Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005); Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197 (1949); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v.

United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 132, at 303-05.

235 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
236 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323 (1988).
237 Id.at 334; Reid, 354 U.S. at 30-31, 39-41.
238 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 n.4, 408, 410-12,420 (1989).
239 Id.at 414 (citation omitted).
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constitutionalism to engender the occasional violent protest at home or
abroad. Neither the decision nor the reaction is inappropriate. They are
simply part of an enduring system that safeguards bedrock constitutional
interests from the passing winds of majority preference. But if the
government official that is seeking to curtail your rights can advance a
legitimate reason for an infringement, then those reasons might begin to have
constitutional relevance. Occasionally, foreign relations concerns provide
such a reason.
In short, proponents of a constitutional CharmingBetsy appear to assume
that foreign relations are exogenous concerns that impinge upon the political
structure in constitutional decision-making. External pressure is brought to
bear on the Executive in its conduct of foreign affairs, and this is deemed to
have constitutional import for the Court. Foreign affairs concerns are
endogenous factors produced within the constitutional system which the
political branches take into account in granting or curtailing individual
liberties. The political branches afford rights consistent with international
obligations, and sometimes they curtail rights consistent with legitimate
foreign policy objectives. The exigencies of foreign affairs may afford
occasion for the political branches to grant legislative or executive privileges
that expand basic rights through the democratic process, but such exigencies
may also occasion the curtailment of constitutional liberties. It is the political
branches-not the courts-that factor the relevance of international discord
in constitutional problems.
Executive assertions of foreign relations concerns, not the Court's
independent appraisal of the importance of diplomatic demarches, are what
give international politics its relevance in constitutional adjudication. The
Bill of Rights does not expand or contract based on enflamed or muted
protests beyond our waters edge.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Charming Betsy doctrine is an indispensable device for pursuing our
nation's foreign policy objectives. It is a structural safeguard that arises out
of the relationship between branches of government in a system of separation
of powers. The competency of the political branches to make and implement
foreign policy decisions depends on the courts avoiding interpretations that
inadvertently authorize or obligate international law violations. Absent
unambiguous guidance, it is presumed that the political branches will avoid
international discord by abrogating international obligations.
The Charming Betsy doctrine, properly understood as a rule of separation
of powers, clarifies the scope of legislative, executive, and judicial authority.
Legislative authority to prescribe conduct abroad should be read consistent
with CharmingBetsy, so that the extraterritorial application of our laws will
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be deemed less offensive if violations of international prescriptive
jurisdiction would not result. It is one thing to presume a law does not apply
abroad if doing so will work an international wrong, but it is quite another
thing to apply it abroad consistent with accepted international practice. The
burdens on the executive branch are decidedly greater when a statute is
applied abroad so as to unlawfully encroach on the sovereignty of other
nations. The presumption against extraterritoriality becomes more difficult to
rebut when it is overlaid with the presumption of CharmingBetsy.
Likewise, the Executive's ability to act pursuant to delegated authority
should be read in light of CharmingBetsy. Under the Youngstown trilogy, the
scope of congressional authority is uncomplicated where legislative authority
or prohibition is explicit, but the ambiguities of authorization are clarified by
the presumption that Congress does not vaguely acquiesce to an international
law violation, much less inchoately require one. The executive freedom
presumed by CharmingBetsy is the freedom to comply with the international
law. Charming Betsy thus shifts Youngstown's implied congressional
guidance in the first and third categories toward international compliance.
The Executive may well find it appropriate and necessary to depart from
international obligations in the absence of congressional authorization, but in
so doing it will be subject to more exacting second category judicial review,
assuming the question is subject to legal review at all.
The scope of judicial authority is likewise clarified in light of Charming
Betsy. Baker v. Carr cautions against judicial pronouncements that might
embarrass the Executive, but so too does Charming Betsy. Prudential
concerns of executive embarrassment are diminished if one can presume that
the courts will endeavor to interpret congressional authorization to avoid
international discord. If Charming Betsy attempts to depoliticize disputes by
interpreting statutes to avoid international political consequences, the
judiciary may be more inclined to seize hold of certain cases and address the
legal questions arising therein.
The enthusiasm for Charming Betsy is now finding application in the
constitutional arena, with advocates contending that foreign relations
concerns should inform our interpretation of constitutional guarantees. While
such concerns are well founded in matters pertaining to foreign relations
clauses, such as the war-making and treaty-making powers, there is little
textual, historical, decisional, or theoretical support for such an approach
when it comes to individual liberties. To argue that constitutional guarantees
must be interpreted to take account of foreign policy objections from our
friends and allies presumes a greater role for foreign relations in our
constitutional system than is warranted.
The proper role for foreign relations is its traditional one-to justify
government infringement of our protected interests. The political branches,
not the judiciary, are vested with the power to decide how relevant foreign
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policy objections are in furthering government interests. To the extent there
is a government interest in displaying a decent respect for the opinion of
humanity, the political branches can so indicate, and the courts in turn will
balance that asserted public interest with the private interest in safeguarding
individual rights.
Washington's fears of the wiles of foreign influence remain with us,
albeit in a different time and context. Many independent-minded Americans
remain alarmed at the opportunities for foreign attachments to "influence or
awe [our] public councils." 240 The Court's posture toward foreign opinion in
interpreting constitutional guarantees should be neither sympathetic nor
antipathetic, but apathetic. Rather than allowing foreign influence to usurp
the confidence of the least diplomatic branch to surrender our interests, we
should continue to entrust the political arm of the government with the task
of balancing what weight foreign opinion should have in the calculus of
constitutional protections. It alone has the foreign expertise to exercise such
political judgment. If it asserts a national interest in countenancing foreign
opinion, then the courts can entertain that expression of interest against the
private claim of constitutional liberty. Until then, foreign relations is of little
moment in the constitutional interpretation of our most precious freedoms.

240 Washington's FarewellAddress, supra note 6, at 214. ("As avenues to foreign
influence in innumerable ways, such [foreign] attachments are particularly alarming to
the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to

tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of -seduction, to mislead public
opinion, to influence or awe the public councils!").

